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 We draw on a detailed grounded theory study of the reactions of Dutch
food firms to the recent introduction of genetically modified foods to inductively
identify the capabilities that firms develop in response to reputational threats. Central
to the view on capabilities we propose are the decision rules organizations use to 
link individual actions to organizational outcomes. Four reputation management
capabilities were identified, which were aimed at, respectively: (1) engaging in a
cooperative dialogue with relevant stakeholders; (2) presenting the organizational
point of view favourably in the eyes of external beholders; (3) avoiding organizational
‘ownership’ of critical reputational threats; and (4) communicating meaningfully with
affected parties, even under conditions of high adversity and time-pressure.
INTRODUCTION
Which types of systematic internal responses do organizations develop to protect
themselves against the impact of reputational threats? Do all organizations rely 
on a singular response mechanism or do some draw on a greater repertoire of
responses? Two intertwined trends have meant that these questions are now more
salient than ever before. On the one hand, academics and practitioners alike are
starting to recognize corporate reputation – the relative standing of an organiza-
tion amongst its peers as perceived by its stakeholders[1] – as one of the most pre-
cious resources available to organizations (Fombrun, 1996; Fombrun and van Riel,
2004; Hall, 1992; Kay, 1993; Whetten and Mackey, 2002). On the other, the busi-
ness world has recently been confronted with reputational threats in unprece-
dented numbers and of an unparalleled impact.[2] In this paper we address the
aforementioned questions by inductively developing a theory of reputation man-
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agement capabilities – coherent sets of decision rules that allow an organization
to protect or improve upon its relative standing amongst its peers as perceived by
its stakeholders. Our theory is rooted in a detailed grounded theory study (Glaser
and Strauss, 1967) of corporate responses to the reputational threats associated
with the recent introduction of genetically modified foods on the European
market.
Reputational threats – events or trends that could have a negative impact on an
organization’s relative status amongst its peers as perceived by its stakeholders if
left unattended – usually come in one of two forms: crises or issues. A crisis can
be seen as a ‘low probability, high impact event that threatens the viability of the
organization and is characterized by ambiguity of cause, effect, and means of
resolution, as well as by a belief that decisions must be made swiftly’ (Pearson and
Clair, 1998, p. 60). Alternatively, issues have been defined as ‘a gap between the
expectations of a stakeholder regarding corporate behavior and the same stake-
holder’s perceptions of actual corporate behavior’ (Nigh and Cochran, 1987, p.
4). Key differences between these two types of reputational threats are that the
former are immediate, unexpected, and henceforth open to many kinds of often
speculative interpretations (Pearson and Clair, 1998), whereas the latter are slowly
evolving, relatively predictably, and often highly politicized in the sense that
affected actors are entrenching themselves in rivalling coalitions based on their
solution preferences (Lamertz et al., 2003). These differences are not without con-
sequence, because both types of reputational threats play a different role in orga-
nizational learning and change processes. Crises represent ‘shocks’ or ‘jolts’ that
open organizations up to the possibility of change, whereas less immediate issues
allow organizations to engage in learning processes like comparing, analysing,
explaining and devising analogies.[3] The immanent differences between these two
types of reputational threats also stimulate organizations to develop multiple rep-
utation management capabilities, each geared specifically towards crises or issues.
CAPABILITIES AS DECISION RULES
What is the essence of organizational capability?[4] At the most basic level, this
notion entails an organization’s ability to accomplish some specific desired result,
say: R (Winter, 2000, pp. 981–2). This implies that we can express organizational
capability with respect to a certain task as a single dummy variable: either the
organization has the R capability and can therefore produce the outcome (XR =
1), or it lacks such a capability and is thus unable to produce it (XR = 0). In fact,
this teleological aspect of organizational capabilities is so commonly accepted that
most capabilities are denoted by the organizational outcome they are meant to
produce, such as: marketing capabilities (Day, 1994), leadership capabilities
(Useem and Harder, 2000), and information systems capabilities (Feeny and 
Willcocks, 1998). Teleology is thus central to the concept of capability, but at the
1350 P. Heugens et al.
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2004
same time it remains somewhat gratuitous to operationalize capabilities by the
results they are supposed to generate – simply because this does not tell us any-
thing about what actually produced the desired organizational outcome R (Priem
and Butler, 2001). To uncover the true essence of organizational capability, we
must therefore establish a plausible chain of events that demonstrates how R could
have been obtained.
Organizational scholars leave little room for doubt as to where this causal chain
should begin: they hold that all organizational outcomes somehow start with indi-
vidual action (Cyert and March, 1963; March and Simon, 1958; Thompson,
1967). Karl Weick puts it as follows: ‘Whenever organizations act – the university
gave tenure, the government negotiated, the bakery searched its memory, the
orchestra enacted chaos – people act. And any assertion that organizations act can
be decomposed into some set of interacts among individuals such that if these
people had not generated and meshed a specific set of their actions, . . . then the
organization would not have performed the act attributed to it’ (1979, p. 34). The
implications of this view for a theory of organizational capability are clear: such
a theory should firmly be rooted in the acts of individuals. But what connects indi-
vidual actions to organizational outcomes?
Rules in Organizations
Like a number of influential scholars before us, we propose that in most organi-
zations decision rules – normative constraints that guide the behaviour of indi-
viduals by determining the relative appropriateness of all the behavioural options
open to them[5] – constitute the primary device for linking the acts of individual
members to organizational results such as R. Weick, for example, writes that all
organizations require ‘assembly rules’ by which individual behaviours are ‘assem-
bled and sequenced to produce an outcome’ (1979, p. 35). Furthermore, Pentland
relies on so-called ‘grammatical rules’ to ‘describe the sequences of actions that
make up organizational processes’ (1995, p. 552). In an analysis of how ‘formal
rules’ govern life in an American research university, March et al. similarly observe
that ‘human actions are organized around rules, and these rules fit together to
create and maintain social systems’ (2000, p. 7). As a final example we point at
DiMaggio and Powell who hold that ‘organized life is explicable’ due to ‘institu-
tional rules’ that ‘constrain individual behaviour by rendering some choices unvi-
able, precluding particular courses of action, and restraining certain patterns of
resource allocation’ (1991, pp. 9–10). In brief, decision rules form an indispens-
able aspect of organizational capability because they connect individual actions to
organizational outcomes. But how do decision rules make this connection?
In order to facilitate organizational action, decision rules must perform three
elementary functions. First, they must overcome bounded rationality problems
(Simon, 1955) that impede the decision-making faculties of individual organiza-
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tion members by removing as much as possible the element of active deliberation
from their task-related decisions. Rules ‘cut the Gordian knots’ of decision making
(Perrow, 1972, p. 31) by excluding the particular merits of particular cases from
practical consideration through an a priori specification of what is to be done
regardless of the circumstances of particular cases (Warnock, 1971). Second, deci-
sion rules must offer a remedy to the ‘problem of the utilization of knowledge not
given to anyone in its totality’ (Hayek, 1945, p. 520). The achievement of complex
organizational results requires the simultaneous or sequential execution of many
individual acts, but this synchronized deployment is hampered by the fact that
organizations are distributed knowledge systems lacking an overseeing ‘mind’
(Tsoukas, 1996). Organizations must therefore rely on decision rules for concert-
ing the efforts of multiple collaborating or interdependently operating specialists
(Grant, 1996a, 1996b). Third, decision rules must help organizations solve the
problem of delegating tasks under the condition of incomplete alignment of inter-
ests between the organization and its members (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Deci-
sion rules can be used to expose individuals to incentives that appropriately induce
them to operate in the organization’s interest (Prendergast, 1999). The following
three sections describe at greater length how decision rules connect individual
action to organizational outcomes by overcoming these three fundamental 
problems.
Decision Rules and the Problem of Bounded Rationality
A theory of organizational capability has to be rooted in a view of individual
behaviour that is compatible with the access to information and the computational
capacities individuals possess in the organizational environment in which they have
to operate (Simon, 1955, pp. 99–100). We know that the decision-making ability
of human beings is subject to both limitations and systematic biases (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1974), but this is not a problem per se. Problems only start to arise
when individuals are put in a setting where the complexity of the decisions they
have to make greatly outweighs their cognitive capacities – like in modern orga-
nizations. Three interrelated aspects of modern organizations in particular make
them particularly inhospitable territory for the boundedly rational decision maker.
First, organizations have a strong tendency towards knowledge ossification
(Berman et al., 2002, p. 17) – the routinization of decision processes that were
once deliberate. Ossification processes mean that individuals gradually grow
unaware of the decisions underlying their actions, which means that certain behav-
iours in organizations can long outlive their reasons for being. Second, employees
may have multiple beliefs about the nature of organizational means–ends rela-
tionship without ever being able to know which of these beliefs is most justified
(Weick, 1979). Finally, it may well be that organizational outcomes are not being
produced by a simple and confined set of antecedents, but by literally hundreds
1352 P. Heugens et al.
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2004
or thousands of complexly interconnected organizational factors (Dierickx and
Cool, 1989).
To overcome the bewilderment and potential paralysis associated with a mis-
match between environmental complexity and decision-making faculties, organi-
zations must deliver their constituents from the ordeals of choice-based action
(Cyert and March, 1963). Such deliverance requires the stipulation of clear deci-
sion rules that accommodate the impaired decision-maker by specifying ex ante how
that individual is supposed to act, whether or not there is a good reason to act as
such in every case that may be encountered. This allows individuals to root their
behaviour in a decision logic that is neither wilful nor consequential in the normal
sense – the logic of appropriateness (Cyert and March, 1963). This decision logic
does not require individuals to anticipate the consequences of all behavioural
options open to them, but merely asks them to follow a set of rules telling them
which of these options are more appropriate than the others (March, 1994).
Hence, by engaging in a certain course of action individuals do not signal any
attempt to maximize their expected utility, but rather demonstrate their willing-
ness to fulfil the duties assigned to them by some central administration (March
and Olson, 1984). Such rule-following in accordance with the logic of appropri-
ateness is central to the theory of organizational capability we propose here,
because a view on how the problem of bounded rationality can be overcome rep-
resents an important first step toward an explanation of how individual actions
are linked to organizational outcomes.
Decision Rules and the Problem of Coordination
Overcoming the problem of bounded rationality by allowing individual con-
stituents to operate under the logic of appropriateness is a necessary first step
towards an explanation of how organizational outcomes are facilitated by means
of decision rules, but by itself not a sufficient one. This is because organizations
are, in the words of Tsoukas, ‘distributed knowledge systems’ (1996, p. 13) in the
sense that they must somehow utilize knowledge that is widely dispersed over many
individual specialists and that cannot be known or controlled by any individual
mind. In other words, telling organizational members what to do individually
without making an effort to synchronize or otherwise purposefully mesh their joint
knowledge and activities into an integrated whole is unlikely to result in satisfac-
tory organizational outcomes. An observation of this kind has led Robert Grant
to state that ‘the fundamental task of organization is to coordinate the efforts of
many specialists’ (Grant, 1996a, p. 113; see also Demsetz, 1991). In our view, deci-
sion rules play a crucial role in helping organizations overcome the problem of
coordination, because they can act as coordinating mechanisms that integrate the
specialist knowledge of many interdependently working individuals without
wasting too much of their time on cross-learning and communication.
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Grant (1996a) has identified a number of such coordinating mechanisms, start-
ing with directives. Specialists can efficiently coordinate their efforts with people
who are specialists in other fields by giving them direct instructions; this relieves
them of the necessity of transferring their knowledge to these individuals by means
of a lengthy training process (Demsetz, 1991). A second mechanism is sequenc-
ing, which involves organizing work activities chronologically so that each specialist
can deliver his or her input to a specific project independently of others (Pentland,
1995). Another option involves the use of routines, which may be defined as ‘rela-
tively complex patterns of behavior . . . triggered by a relatively small number of
initiating signals or choices and functioning as a recognizable unit in a relatively
automatic fashion’ (Winter, 1986, p. 165). These routines act as catalysts for
complex interactions between individuals by increasing the simultaneity of their
behaviour, even in absence of significant communication between them.[6] A final
mode of coordination is group problem solving, which refers to all forms of task
coordination amongst specialists involving consensus-building, personal commu-
nication, and cross-learning. Since this latter mechanism is usually very effective
but rarely very efficient, Grant (1996a) recommends that this form of coordina-
tion be reserved for unusual and complex tasks. These coordinating mechanisms
are at the core of the theory of organizational capability we introduce here,
because an approach to overcoming the problem of coordination represents an
important second step toward an explanation of how individual actions are linked
to organizational outcomes.
Decision Rules and the Problem of Delegation
In our discussion of the problem of bounded rationality, we pointed out that 
decision-rules allow individuals to operate in a non-calculative way by enabling
them to model their behaviour after ethical requirements or norms of appropri-
ateness (Frey, 1998). But Sunstein and Ullmann-Margalit (1999) warn us that the
decision to adhere to the logic of appropriateness is not a non-calculative decision
but in fact a rational attempt to reduce the problems associated with on-the-spot
decision making in a later stage. In other words, the a priori decision to act non-
calculatively at a later point in time is a calculative decision, which is made while
the individual is still operating under the logic of consequentialism (Cyert and
March, 1963). Like the problem of bounded rationality, this is not a problem per
se, but it is in fact a problem in modern complex organizations where delegation
relationships abound.
Delegation is the hallmark of modern organization; not just delegation between
owners and professional managers (Berle and Means, 1932), but also amongst and
between managers and employees themselves. Entrusting others with tasks that
otherwise would have had to be performed by the self is perhaps the primary
mechanism that explains the productivity of the modern firm, because it allows
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the leveraging of the diversity of skills in the organizational arsenal ( Jacobides and
Croson, 2001). But delegation also creates potential misalignments of interests
within organizations, because the delegator and his or her delegatees do not nec-
essarily share common objectives (Eisenhardt, 1989a). This is a problem when 
delegatees follow the logic of consequentialism to determine whether they should
switch to the logic of appropriateness. Given a discrepancy between their private
interests and those of the organization, rational deliberation on their part may
lead them to the conclusion that it is not in their best interest to blindly follow the
decision rules prescribed to them by the organization.
A realignment of interests between delegator and delegatee therefore has to take
place before individuals are put in the position where they have to choose between
surrendering to the logic of appropriateness and remaining in the deliberative
mode of practical reasoning. This realignment can be accomplished by adopting
incentive systems – composed of decision rules – that reward individuals for rule-
following and penalize them for rule-defiant behaviour (Prendergast, 1999). The
adoption of such incentive rules represents a third necessary step towards a theory
of organizational capability. The three steps we described are jointly sufficient to
explain how individual actions are linked to organizational outcomes, because they
tell organizational members what to do individually, how to coordinate their efforts
with others, and why it is rational for them to do so.
Common Misunderstandings about Decision Rules
These are the contours of our theory of capabilities as decision rules. But before
we proceed by introducing the research project, we will address some common
misunderstandings about decision rules, notably that they are necessarily rigid and
immanently codified. The persisting idea that rules breed inflexibility probably
derives from the influential literature on bureaucratic ‘dysfunctions’ and ‘bureau-
pathologies’ (Blau, 1955; Gouldner, 1954; Merton, 1957). Yet, there is no con-
vincing case to be made for a direct relationship between rule proliferation and
organizational obstinacy. In fact, numerous scholars have pointed at the crucial
role decision rules play in preserving the adaptability and flexibility of organiza-
tions. Eisenhardt and Sull (2001) argue that ‘simple rules’ provide organizations
with the structure to seize business opportunities in turbulent, ever-changing
markets. Similarly, Weick (1998) perceives a crucial link between decision rules and
improvisation in organizations. According to his view, the idea that improvisation
boils down to ‘making something out of nothing’ is astonishingly incomplete. The
true nature of improvisation can only be understood if we acknowledge the fact
that successful improvisers are skilled practitioners who create as well as follow
rules, such that their activity is controlled but not predetermined. For March (Levitt
and March, 1988; March, 1981, 1996), rules are both the medium and the message
of organizational learning. Organizational experiences are recorded in rules to
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guarantee their preservation, but such ‘etching’ of experiences in accessible
memory also facilitates their diffusion. People lacking first-hand experience with
certain types of problems can benefit from the knowledge of experienced others
by applying the rules these experts once recorded. In sum, organizational rules are
at the core of various crucial adaptive processes in organizations.
It is also a mistake to presume that organizational rules must necessarily be 
codified, as many rules in organizations tend to be unwritten.[7] March et al. (2000,
pp. 18–19) point out that the distinction between written and unwritten rules is
often far from consequential since the commonalities between them are as plenti-
ful as the differences are scarce. First, both types of rules are maintained and com-
municated through socialization. Second, both written and unwritten rules exist
to offset the bounded rationality- and self-interestedness-biases in individual deci-
sion makers. Third, in both manifestations rules can be self-enforcing, provided
that an actor’s compliance is seen as appropriate in the eyes of influential third-
party observers. Finally, all rules reproduce social structure by accumulating ex-
periences over several generations of rule-followers. Hence, codification is not a
necessary characteristic of decision rules.
THE RESEARCH PROJECT
The purpose of this paper is to inductively develop a contextually relevant theory
of organizational responses to reputational threats, following the procedures sug-
gested by the grounded theory approach (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). These pro-
cedures entail a constant comparison between an emerging theory and data
throughout the data collection and analysis process. The unfolding theory acts as
an interpretative lens that highlights the importance of empirical facts and dis-
tinctions, whereas previously gathered data simultaneously focus attention on the
theory’s adequacy as a framework for capturing the relevant dimensions of the
most recent data being collected (Isabella, 1990). The final product of this tran-
sient truce between theory and data should be a conceptualization that accounts
for all relevant nuances in the data.[8]
The empirical basis of this study is a four-year (September 1997–October 2001)
qualitative investigation of the reactions of the Dutch food industry to the intro-
duction of genetically modified food ingredients. With the foods themselves often
being described as ‘Franken-foods’ (Miller, 1992), ‘Über-plants’ (Walsh, 1999), or
‘Demon seeds’ (The Economist, 1998), this setting easily meets the criteria of an
‘extreme case’, one in which the need for and the development of reputation man-
agement capabilities is more evident and transparent than in other situations
(Eisenhardt, 1989b). Conceptually, this study builds on the previously outlined
generic theory of organizational capabilities as decision rules, and our ambitions
with this theory are two-fold. First, we strive for an application of the generic
theory in the hope of demonstrating its relevance. Second, we aim for a contex-
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tualization of the generic framework in order to make it more amenable to the
facts of the situation as we found them.
Data Collection
During the research period, we studied the introduction process of genetically
engineered foods in Europe from a variety of different empirical angles.[9] First, to
gather firsthand knowledge of the reputation management capabilities of the firms
in the Dutch food sector, we conducted so-called focused interviews (Merton et al.,
1956) with key players in the biotechnology issue. To obtain data that captured
the greatest possible variation in reputation management experiences, we selected
a group of 23 key players in the issue, following Glaser and Strauss’s (1967) notion
of theoretical sampling in terms of theoretical relevance. More specifically, we
sought variation with respect to the roles these various participants played in the
issue, as indicated by both the nature of the organizations that employed them
and by their job titles. A full listing of our interviewees is presented in Table I.
Secondly, we conducted a large-scale archival study to corroborate our inter-
view findings with objectified printed data. We were allowed access to the archives
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Table I. Listing of interviewees
Number Organization Job title
1. Product Board for Margarine, Fats, & Oils Secretary
2. Product Board for Margarine, Fats, & Oils Policy Director
3. Product Board for Margarine, Fats, & Oils Head of Communications
4. Product Board for Margarine, Fats, & Oils Editor Biotechnology Newsletter
5. Product Board for Grains, Seeds, & Legumes Policy Director
6. Product Board for Animal Feed Policy Director
7. Ministry of Economic Affairs Coordinator Biotechnology
8. Ministry of Agriculture Coordinator Biotechnology
9. Dutch Standardization Institute Standardization Consultant Food and
Agriculture
10. Consumer & Biotechnology Policy Director
11. Consumer’s League Policy Director
12. Unilever Issues Manager
13. Unilever Purchasing Officer
14. Unilever Public Affairs Manager
15. Numico Director Corporate Affairs
16. Shell Public Affairs Manager
17. Gist-Brocades Director of Public Affairs
18. Gist-Brocades Senior External Communications
19. Ahold Public Affairs Manager
20. Het Financieele Dagblad Editor
21. De Volkskrant Science Editor
22. Schuttelaar & Partners Communication Advisor
23. Wageningen Agricultural University Professor of Mass Communications
of the Product Board for Margarine, Fats, and Oils, a semi-public organization
that serves the interests of its associated industry members. These archives con-
sisted of a broad array of materials, ranging from letters and faxes to industry
crisis plans and consultancy reports. Furthermore, three roundtable discussions
were organized, in which we invited both industry and NGO (non-governmental
organization) representatives to discuss our initial research findings with us. We
were also able to use a collection of audiovisual materials, consisting of every tele-
vision broadcast on Dutch public television ever devoted to the issue. Finally, we
used a number of publicly available resources, such as the Internet, international
magazines, and Dutch newspapers as a back-up, to check whether we had missed
any significant events.
Data Analysis
Obviously, these different lines of qualitative inquiry provided us with more data
than we could use and interpret directly. We therefore sought for a means to pull
the data from these various sources together in a way that would simultaneously
further our understanding of the various reputation management capabilities in
use and reduce the ever-present danger of ‘death by data asphyxiation’ (Pettigrew,
1988; cited in Eisenhardt, 1989b). We decided to use vignettes, ‘focused descrip-
tion[s] of a series of events taken to be representative, typical, or emblematic in
the case [one is] doing’ (Miles and Huberman, 1994, p. 81), as our primary tool
for data reduction and interpretation.
The vignette strategy served three critical purposes. First, we structured our data
collection efforts by using draft versions of these vignettes in the interview process.
This stimulated our respondents to talk about salient themes that emerged in
earlier interviews, and pre-structured our later interviews to facilitate sorting and
coding processes. Second, our vignettes told us when it was time to stop collect-
ing data. After approximately the seventeenth interview a saturation process
started to set in (Glaser and Strauss, 1967), after which very few new facts and
opinions emerged that otherwise would have forced us to substantially rewrite the
vignettes. Third, the little narratives allowed us to validate our research findings
by having them reviewed by a number of key informants (N = 5). The rationale
behind this tactic is that informants and participants may disagree with the
researchers’ conclusions and interpretations, but they may as a rule not disagree
over the actual facts of the case (Yin, 1994). The reviewers that we used to verify
our findings are numbered 1, 2, 5, 13, and 22 in Table I.
FOUR REPUTATION MANAGEMENT CAPABILITIES
During the research process, a number of qualitatively distinct types of responses
to reputational threats emerged from the data inductively. We made constant com-
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parisons between these emerging empirical insights on the one hand, and our
generic theory of organizational capability on the other. The initial framework
allowed us to ask our respondents more focused questions during the data collec-
tion period, whereas the insights we gained from these informants permitted us to
apply our framework to the empirical materials we were investigating. This com-
parative process ultimately resulted in four contextualized versions of our generic
framework, each representing a reputation management capability that captured
the essence and explained the tinges of a distinct corporate response. We labelled
these four capabilities as follows: (1) dialogue, (2) corporate silence, (3) advocacy,
and (4) crisis communication.
Dialogue Capabilities
The first reputation management capability we identified allowed managers to
build cooperative and trust-based relationships with a broad range of external con-
stituencies, especially those with non-economic motivations (Heugens et al., 2002;
Sharma and Vredenburg, 1998). The managers who took part in the development
and implementation of these dialogue capabilities seemed convinced that they had
to reach out to the critical stakeholders of their organizations in order to avert the
impact of reputational threats. But their jobs were significantly complicated by the
excessive complexity of the environment in which they had to operate. Not only
were they forced to cope with all the multifaceted aspects of organizational life in
general, but also with a multitude of external stakeholders and the often unpre-
dictable interactions amongst those parties (Rowley, 1997).
Given the unusual complexities of their operating environments, it remains
questionable whether any of these managers had the deliberative faculties to
foresee most of the external dynamics that would arise in response to their attempts
at establishing a dialogue. To get their jobs done, many of them therefore switched
from a consequential decision-making mode to an approach based on the logic of
appropriateness (Cyert and March, 1963). Rather than trying to predict the con-
sequences of every decision they made, they chose to adhere to a set of more con-
crete decision rules.[10] These rules, for example, specified that managers should
organize round-table discussions involving all the stakeholders the company criti-
cally depended on. Other rules instructed them to supply key stakeholders with
new information that could be of interest to them as soon as the organization had
acquired and validated it. Some rules even specified that stakeholder views should
be used as direct input for corporate decisions pertaining to the reputational threat
at hand. In combination, these rules enabled the managers in our sample to main-
tain a dialogue with external parties, even if they were unsure at times about the
direct results of their actions (see Table II).
In addition to providing a set of behavioural guidelines for the individual 
specialists to follow, reputation management capabilities should also have a 
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Table II. Dialogue capabilities
Vignettes Decision rules Data extracts
Property 1: Individual action
Issues managers tend to believe Æ Organize round- ‘I strongly support the roundtable
that engaging in a dialogue with tables for which all negotiation model. My Ministry has
interested or affected outside relevant parties are organized a number of roundtables
stakeholders will help their invited. on biotechnology in the past. (. . .)
organizations to improve upon [Due to the introduction of new
their competitive position, Æ Provide key crops] the importance of open
reputation, and societal legitimacy. stakeholders with roundtable discussions will only
Consequentially, they engage in all information pro- increase in the future.’
sorts of communicative activities actively.
such as informing and negotiating ‘As companies we need to reach out
with outside stakeholders. In Æ Co-opt influential to other parties ourselves. (. . .) We
general, issues managers outsiders by allowing have to make field trips to societal
exercising the dialogue capability them joint decision- organizations and the government.’
define their relevant ‘target making power.
audience’ more broadly than
those utilizing other capabilities.
Property 2: Coordinating mechanisms
When managers decide to use a Æ Meet personally ‘Through informal consultations we
dialogic approach, many of the with all the parties try to inform the societal cadre. (. . .)
coordination problems that that could influence We have made specific agreements
inevitably arise when multiple this issue. with certain NGOs to consult them
specialists work on a complex before we go public with any new
project simultaneously tend to be Æ Discuss all options piece of information.’
resolved in ways that require that  are open to the
significant amounts of ‘face time’. firm with the ‘Policy documents are just an
Experts adjust their activities to dialogue partners. outcome. (. . .) The fact that we have
those of other specialists by to consult all of the involved parties
learning from them how they Æ Aim for consensus during the writing process to get 
perform their jobs and by on all aspects of the their input is of much more value.’
teaching them the essentials of issue that pertain to
their own functions. the organization.
Property 3: Incentive systems
Organizations opting to use a Æ Reward behaviour A policy maker at the Product
dialogic approach to reputation that promotes better Board for Margarine, Fats, and Oils
management tend to encourage relationships between gets promoted to Permanent
behaviour that results in the the organization and Secretary, due to his leading role in
exchange of information and its external the informal consultations ( factual
redistribution of responsibilities constituencies. example).
across organizational boundaries.
They also discourage behaviour Æ Penalize behaviour
that tends to lead to more isolated that frustrates the 
responses to pressing issues. organization’s 
negotiations with
outside parties.
coordination mechanism in place to adjust the efforts of all these individuals to
one another. Companies that used the dialogue capability frequently resorted to
group problem solving (Grant, 1996a) as a means of overcoming potential coor-
dination problems. Dialogue decision rules dictated that managers should try to
meet personally with all the parties that could play a decisive role in the evolution
of the reputational threat. Managers also followed guidelines advising them to root
all decisions involving multiple parties in consensus, rather than in persuasion or
coercion. In other words, the dialogue capability also consisted of an additional
set of decision rules stipulating that personal and communication-intensive forms
of coordination were most appropriate (see Table II).
Finally, since not every rule stipulated in organizations coheres well enough with
the interests of individual managers to be followed spontaneously, organizational
capabilities also need to provide and maintain an incentive system that stimulates
rule-following behaviour in accordance with the logic of appropriateness. In case
of the dialogue capability, these incentives were aimed at increasing the likelihood
of managerial behaviour that stimulated better relationships with external parties
by rewarding successful attempts at establishing stakeholder dialogue. At the same
time, the dialogue incentive system also reprimanded behaviour frustrating the
organizational ability to engage in meaningful relationships with outside con-
stituencies (see Table II).
Advocacy Capabilities
The second reputation management capability we uncovered through the present
study was aimed at persuading external audiences that the organizational position
on an otherwise controversial issue was both rationally acceptable and morally
legitimate. The managers exercising these advocacy capabilities believed that they
were justified in using their rhetorical and propagandizing skills to make the orga-
nizations they worked for look better in the eyes of external beholders. Again, it
must not have been easy for these managers to make reliable estimates of the per-
suasiveness of their actions, since the effect of advocacy attempts is not only a
function of the coherence and compellingness of the corporate message, but also
of the number and intensity of dissenting voices in the organizational environ-
ment (Grunig and Grunig, 1992).
An important aspect of these advocacy capabilities is therefore that they
equipped managers with a number of detailed instructions that enabled them to
economize on cognitive effort by allowing them to follow rules in accordance with
the logic of appropriateness. Such rules, for example, instructed managers to
design and implement responses to reputational threats that sought to legitimize
their organizations’ production methods and safety standards in the eyes of con-
sumers. Often they hired specialized corporate communication agencies to provide
the content for these public affairs campaigns. Other rules informed managers on
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how to deal with the potential impact of national authorities and the EU govern-
ment on their businesses, and urged them to make extensive use of political mar-
keting tools to present their organizations favourably in these non-market arenas
(Harris and Lock, 1996; see Table III).
In addition to instructing individual managers on what to do under which cir-
cumstances, advocacy capabilities should also provide a solution to coordination
problems that might arise when these professionals try to combine their efforts to
resolve joint problems. Since the development of advocacy-oriented responses to
reputational threats requires the execution of many interrelated but essentially sep-
arable tasks, many organizations using an advocacy approach relied on rules that
prescribed sequenced forms of coordination. Advocacy tasks (such as competitive
intelligence, market research, campaign strategizing, copy writing, and communi-
cation channel management) were typically organized as stand-alone activities, so
that small teams of professionals could work on them separately. These activities
were also organized in time-patterned sequences, so that the output of one group
provided the input for another without there being much need for inter-group
communication and adjustment (see Table III).
A final aspect of the advocacy capability is that it should persuade the man-
agers it addresses to follow the behavioural and coordination rules it prescribes.
To that end, the capability provides incentives to stimulate behaviour that helps to
create a more favourable external image for the organization. At the same time,
it puts sanctions on any display of behaviour that could exert a negative influence
on outsiders’ assessment of the corporation’s actions and decisions (see Table III).
Corporate Silence Capabilities
A third reputation management capability we identified was aimed at avoiding
organizational ‘ownership’ of the reputational threats generated by the introduc-
tion of genetically enhanced foods. For our present purposes, ownership of repu-
tational threats (Oomens and van den Bosch, 1999) may be interpreted as a strong
association in the eyes of relevant publics between an organization and a given
reputational threat, which could potentially lead to additional responsibilities on
behalf of the organization for resolving that threat. The managers using these so-
called corporate silence capabilities tried to keep the company name out of the
public debate as much as possible, in an attempt to avoid their organization and
modern biotechnology always being mentioned in the same breath. The task of
maintaining corporate silence is a very complex one, not only since most of the
structures and processes determining the course of the public debate are not under
corporate control, but also because it is exceptionally difficult to make sure that
none of the organization’s employees breaks the cordon of silence.
Corporate silence capabilities therefore offer managers practical guidelines in
the form of decision rules that minimize the need for on-the-spot decision making
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Table III. Advocacy capabilities
Vignettes Decision rules Interview extracts
Property 1: Individual action
Issues managers assume that it is Æ Develop and ‘Our policy is one of “public
possible to devise effective execute a well- education”. We publish a lot
strategies for gaining the designed public affairs about modern biotechnology. (. . .)
endorsement of outside parties, plan. Through the introduction, we try
even with respect to highly to contribute to the public’s
controversial issues. To that end, Æ Hire internal and knowledge and understanding.’
they develop persuasion-oriented external
public affairs plans (for which the communication ‘The people in Brussels are
content is often provided by experts to present the lukewarm about biotechnology.
specialized communication organization We invest a lot of time and money
agencies). These plans often have a favourably in its in convincing them that what we
dual focus on both the market (i.e., market arenas. do is absolutely necessary for the
consumers and competitors) and competitiveness of the Union and
non-market arenas (national and Æ Use political poses no threat whatsoever to its
supra-national governments) in marketing strategies citizens.’
which the firm competes. to compete better in
the non-market arenas
of the firm.
Property 2: Coordinating mechanisms
If managers decide to adopt an Æ Organize the ‘Managing the issue of modern
advocacy approach, the bulk of the advocacy tasks as biotechnology is primarily a 
coordination problems that emerge stand-alone activities, matter of doing your homework
when many specialists have to work so that every team of thoroughly. Here at [a Dutch
together to solve joint problems are experts can deliver its biotechnology-driven firm], one
kinked out by means of sequencing inputs without having set of experts is monitoring
activities. Many of the tasks that are to coordinate them continuously what is happening in
required to design and implement with others. Brussels and in Strasbourg (. . .),
public affairs plans are in fact whereas others are testing and
relatively separable (even though Æ Organize these assessing the safety of our 
they are interdependent and activities as products.’
interconnected in many ways). overlapping sequences
These tasks can therefore be as much as possible to ‘The aim of my department is to
performed in relative isolation in a speed up execution “sell” the new technology to the
time-patterned sequence to time. public by adopting a high profile
minimize the need for inter-task communications strategy. (. . .)
coordination and communication. Æ If parallel Other departments are
processing is [simultaneously] exploring the
impossible to attain, benefits of genetic modification to
organize these make our case more convincing.’
activities in a time-
patterned sequence to
minimize
interferences.
in complex situations. Most importantly, these guidelines tell managers to put all
external communication tasks in the hands of a relatively small number of well-
trained professionals. This centralization rule allows managers to substantially
reduce intra-organizational plurivocity (Thachankary, 1992), and hence to
promote the organizational point of view in a single, unambiguous voice. Other
guidelines supporting the centralization rule prevented non-communication
employees from making public statements and directed information-seeking
outside parties directly to the communication unit of the organization (see Table
IV).
Since corporate silence capabilities depend on the cooperation of many indi-
vidual specialists for their proper functioning, it is essential that they also offer a
solution to coordination problems. The dominant coordination mechanism for this
capability consisted of directives – impersonal standards and instructions regulat-
ing the interactions between individuals (Van de Ven et al., 1976). To overcome
plurivocity, the corporate silence approach first of all required the knowledge of
key communication professionals to be codified in handbooks and manuals. These
internal regulations specified most of the necessary procedures to be followed for
communicating successfully with both employees and outsiders. Furthermore, in
most organizations using the corporate silence approach, all employees except for
designated communication professionals were explicitly instructed not to commu-
nicate with outsiders about current reputational threats. Together, these rules
enabled the organization to present a unified view on modern biotechnology to
the outside world (see Table IV).
Finally, the corporate silence capability also needs an incentive structure to stimu-
late corporate employees to follow the specified decision rules. More than any of
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Table III. Continued
Vignettes Decision rules Interview extracts
Property 3: Incentive systems
Many organizations that select the Æ Reward behaviour Journalists that report favourably
advocacy approach as their that presents the cause on biotechnology (e.g., describe it
preferred issues management of the organization as genetic modification rather
strategy explicitly stimulate more favourably to than genetic manipulation) are
behaviour that helps to create a external publics. ‘rewarded’ in the sense that they
more favourable impression of their receive the direct phone numbers
goals and intentions with outside Æ Penalize behaviour of key corporate officials, which
audiences. At the same time, these that has a negative they can use the next time they 
organizations also put a disincentive influence on the are working on a biotechnology-
on employee behaviour that thwarts assessment of the firm related story ( factual example).
their favourable external image. in the eyes of critical
constituencies.
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Table IV. Corporate silence capabilities
Vignettes Decision rules Interview extracts
Property 1: Individual action
Managers using the corporate Æ Make communicating ‘I believe that we all should just
silence approach hope that their with outside keep our mouths shut and wait for
attempts to dissociate the names constituencies the the day that a product with more
of the companies for which they exclusive prerogative of benefits [than modified soy] comes
work from the biotechnology communication along. Until that day, we cannot
issue will eventually lead to a professionals. explain the benefits [of genetic
decreased chance of issue modification] to the public.’
ownership. Their efforts are Æ Strongly discourage
mainly focused on centralizing other employees to give ‘We don’t like to communicate
the corporate communication their personal opinion about biotechnology. The public
function in the hands of a few about organizational knows that we have a stake in this
specialized professionals, in an issues in public. issue, which could easily give it a
attempt to present the wrong impression. (. . .) Just let the
corporation’s views on modern Æ Direct outsiders that consumer representatives do the
biotechnology as a unified request information to talking on biotechnology. Informing
whole, rather than as an the designated the public is their turf.’
uncontrollable amalgam of communication 
competing voices. professionals only.
Property 2: Coordinating mechanisms
If managers decide to adopt a Æ Codify the knowledge ‘It is an absolute necessity to
corporate silence approach, of key communication centralize our information services
their coordination activities will professionals in issues [with respect to the biotechnology
mainly be focused on silencing management plans and issue]. (. . .) A decentralized
voices that deviate from or communication manuals. information strategy would be a
compete with the organization’s Public Affairs atrocity.’
official position on the modern Æ Specify both 
biotechnology issue. To procedures for ‘We have written down the lessons
accomplish this end, they will communicating with that we learned from this first
codify their expert knowledge in outsiders as well as introduction [of genetically altered
readily accessible materials, and internal lines of soy] in what we call our ‘charter’
promulgate rules and directives communication in these [essentially a crisis scenario]. (. . .)
that urge the employees of the plans and manuals. We expect our employees to use it
organization that are in non- for all subsequent introductions.’
communication functions to Æ Specifically instruct
strictly abide by them. the members of the 
organization to abide by
the rules documented in
these plans and manuals.
Property 3: Incentive systems
The incentive system chosen by Æ Reward behaviour The Product Board of Margarine,
organizations using a corporate that reduces the visibility Fats and Oils (a semi-public
silence approach differs of the organization with organization representing the
significantly from other issues respect to critical issues. interests of the Dutch Fats and Oils
management incentive systems. industry) was endowed with a
Rather than rewarding Æ Penalize behaviour €350,000 budget after it had agreed
compliant behaviour, the that increases the to become the mouthpiece for the
corporate silence system is likelihood of issue industry on biotechnology-related
much more oriented towards ownership for the affairs ( factual example).
the penalization of deviant organization.
behaviour.
the incentive systems of the other three reputation management capabilities we
encountered, the corporate silence system was oriented towards penalizing deviant
behaviour rather than stimulating compliance (Morrison and Milliken, 2000).
Employees were certainly rewarded for behaviour that reduced the association
between the company and modern biotechnology in the public media, but more
telling were the instances in which employees were fined or even demoted after
presenting their personal opinion on biotechnology in public (see Table IV).
Crisis Communication Capabilities
Crisis communication capabilities allow managers to engage in a purposeful
exchange of information with interested outside constituencies during immediate
reputational threats. Crisis communication is a highly complicated activity because
crises usually leave managers with very little time to respond to the challenges and
critiques of affected stakeholders. Furthermore, firms struck by an immediate rep-
utational threat are typically affected by a number of conditions that hamper their
ability to communicate with outside parties, such as decreased source credibility
(because the organization may be tainted by a regrettable event; Leiss, 1994) and
receiver problems (because affected non-experts cannot be expected to readily
assimilate and understand expert views on what went wrong; Powell and Leiss,
1997). More than any of the other responses to reputational threats, crisis com-
munication capabilities must therefore equip managers with decision rules allow-
ing them to exchange information with affected stakeholders without forcing them
to make difficult on-the-spot decisions.
Most of the decision rules we encountered in organizations relying on crisis
communication took one of three forms. First, many of the organizations in our
sample used rules that stimulated managers to look for ‘weak signals’ in their exter-
nal environment (Ansoff, 1980), because these small stimuli could one day evolve
into significant reputational threats. Second, these organizations tended to have
rules in place that instructed managers how to identify emerging threats rapidly
and to interpret them ‘on automatic’. This type of automatic crisis identification
starts by learning the characteristics of a number of standardized crisis categories
and framing new crises in terms of these archetypical classes as they develop
(Dutton, 1993). Finally, managers that were frequently involved with crisis com-
munication followed rules that instructed them to match certain crisis categories
with standardized, well-learnt responses (Daft and Weick, 1984). In turn, these
responses allowed them to communicate purposefully with affected parties in high-
pressured situations without compromising the organizational position on modern
biotechnology (see Table V).
When an organization is confronted with events that require immediate atten-
tion, coordination problems easily rise to the fore. Due to the heightened time pres-
sure involved, crisis situations usually rule out all possible forms of coordination
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Table V. Crisis communication capabilities
Vignettes Decision rules Interview extracts
Property 1: Individual action
Communication professionals Æ Train communication ‘I never leave home without my
relying on the crisis professionals to identify “fact pack” [a dossier containing
communication approach weak signals emanating the most recent information
usually have very little time in the organizational concerning the introduction of
available for reacting to the environment. genetically engineered foods] these
grievances of the stakeholders days. (. . .) If something happens,
that have been affected by the Æ Teach communication and I need to get on television, I
crisis. Their reputation professionals to analyse need to feel prepared.’
management efforts are strategic issues on 
therefore principally focused on automatic to reduce ‘Our company has recently drawn a
reducing the organization’s reaction time. lot of activist attention. (. . .) If you
response time. To that end, show up at work in the morning,
they are able to use a number Æ Teach communication and you see a group of activists
of rules that allow them to professionals sets of waving their banners on the 22nd
identify, analyse, and respond standardized, well-learnt floor of your office building, the
to issues faster. These rules responses to further key is not to panic. Usually, I just
provide them with certain reduce reaction time. invite them in for a coffee.’
cognitive ‘shortcuts’ that allow
them to compare new crises
with past learning experiences.
Property 2: Coordinating mechanisms
Since immediate crises are Æ Organize ‘Our issues management unit is
usually characterized by the communication very small [5 people working at the
fact that there is little or no specialists into relatively Dutch headquarters], and we all
response time available, small and stable units to work on this floor. (. . .) Also, all of
reputation management increase the simultaneity our offices have glass walls, so that
specialists in the crisis of their goal-oriented we can find each other immediately
communication mode cannot behaviours. whenever a situation requires our
rely on forms of coordination urgent attention.’
that require intensive Æ Empower these groups
communication. Effective crisis of specialists sufficiently ‘I often compare my [issues
communication capabilities to facilitate autonomous management] unit with a swarm of
therefore supply these problem-solving birds. We use each other as our
specialists with decision rules behaviour. primary set of coordinates. (. . .)
that allow them to adjust their That is how we keep track of one
behaviours to one another in a Æ Socialize new group another and of the outside world.
routine fashion, without much members properly,
need for additional verbal enabling them to learn 
information transfer. and acquire the skills of
more seasoned team 
members.
that require intensive communication and face-to-face contact. What is more, crisis
situations are often too idiosyncratic and arise too unexpectedly to allow for coor-
dination by means of straightforward standard operating procedures. Therefore,
organizations with well-developed crisis communication skills often rely on the rou-
tines of their communication specialists as their principal coordination mecha-
nism. To stimulate routine-based task coordination, organizations often allow their
reputation management professionals to operate in relatively small and stable
groups to stimulate the simultaneity of their actions and decision-making. Because
of their relatively high degree of social cohesion, these groups are able to develop
the routines that allow them to operate as a single-minded ‘pack’ when they are
put under time pressure (see Table V).
Even though providing professional workers with a large degree of autonomy
and the ability to work in small groups can be seen as rewards in and of them-
selves, many of the organizations that relied on crisis communication capabilities
complemented these stimuli with more orthodox incentives. They rewarded indi-
viduals who were responsible for implementing innovations that reduced the orga-
nization’s reaction time with respect to critical reputational threats and penalized
employees who caused unnecessary delays in the process of formulating and imple-
menting responses (see Table V).
Cross-Sectional Analysis
The preceding sections presented the four reputation management capabilities we
encountered in our study of the responses of Dutch food firms to the reputational
threats imposed by the introduction of genetically enhanced foods. These sections
provide us with valuable insights into what capabilities were employed by the firms
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Table V. Continued
Vignettes Decision rules Interview extracts
Property 3: Incentive systems
Since time is the most critical Æ Reward behaviour A staff employee that managed to
asset for organizations that are that minimizes the speed up a large multinational’s
struck by immediate crises, effective response time of successful responses to a critical
managers tend to reward the organization. crisis was promoted to the position
behaviour that decreases the of issues manager at the Dutch
organizational response time, Æ Penalize behaviour headquarters ( factual example).
whereas they put a penalty on that delays the 
behaviour that increases the formulation of adequate
pressure on the organization by responses to the demands
slowing down its reactive angry or frustrated 
processes. outside constituencies.
in our sample (cf. research question 1), but they tell us nothing about who used
these capabilities in which combinations (cf. research question 2). To address this
issue, we will present a brief cross-sectional analysis (see Table VI).
We obtained this analysis by juxtaposing the types of capabilities we uncovered
(displayed along the horizontal dimension of Table VI) with the organizations in
our sample (comprising the vertical dimension of this table). For the actual analy-
sis, we used the 14 interview reports we obtained from individuals working for
these organizations. Each of these reports was systematically and thoroughly
examined for evidence of data fitting the four capability categories. In line with a
procedure suggested by Isabella (1990), we extracted verbatim sections from these
reports (paragraphs in which individuals referred to an element or characteristic
of a particular capability), recorded them on separate sheets of paper to represent
the core of an individual’s statements, and coded them into the final categories.
In total, 259 such excerpts were recorded.
The cross-sectional analysis revealed that many organizations relied on multi-
ple reputation management capabilities rather than focusing on a singular
response pattern – five organizations used all four capabilities, two organizations
used three, and one organization relied on only two capabilities. Overall, the orga-
nizations in the sample relied most extensively on dialogue (accounting for 35 per
cent of all coded fragments), closely followed by corporate silence (30 per cent).
Less popular were advocacy (19 per cent) and crisis communication (16 per cent).
But not all organizations in our sample adhere to this pattern. Three of the orga-
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Table VI. Cross-sectional analysis
Organization Dialogue Advocacy Corp. silence Crisis comm. Total
Unilever 31 (48%) 11 (17%) 15 (23%) 8 (12%) 65
Numico 4 (14%) 7 (25%) 11 (39%) 6 (21%) 28
Ahold 8 (22%) 9 (25%) 12 (33%) 7 (19%) 36
Gist-Brocades 7 (18%) 13 (33%) 16 (41%) 3 (8%) 39
Prod. Board MFO 26 (44%) 10 (17%) 7 (12%) 15 (26%) 58
Prod. Board GSL 7 (54%) 0 (0%) 4 (31%) 2 (15%) 13
Prod. Board AF 5 (45%) 0 (0%) 5 (45%) 1 (9%) 11
Stand. Institute 2 (22%) 0 (0%) 7 (78%) 0 (0%) 9
Total 90 (35%) 50 (19%) 77 (30%) 42 (16%) 100%
Notes:
The organizations in this table correspond to those listed in Table I. Included in this analysis are directly involved
business firms and their representative organizations. Excluded are firms without a direct stake in the issue, jour-
nalists, functionaries from the Ministries of Economic Affairs and Agriculture, NGO representatives, and 
independent advisors.
The numbers listed in the table correspond to the number of paragraphs from the interview reports in which (ele-
ments of ) a particular reputation management capability was mentioned. Note that we interviewed several people
in some organizations: four at the Product Board for Margarine, Fats, & Oils; three at Unilever; and two at Gist-
Brocades (currently DSM).
nizations in our sample relied predominantly on dialogue (Unilever, Product Board
for Margarine, Fats, and Oils, and Product Board for Grains, Seeds and Legumes),
whereas four others were primarily focused on corporate silence (Numico, Ahold,
Gist-Brocades, and the Standardization Institute). One organization devoted equal
amounts of attention to both capabilities (Product Board for Animal Feed).
But perhaps the most revealing cross-sectional analysis we can perform on this
modest data matrix is an investigation of the dominant response pattern of these
organizations (operationalized as the specific combination of the two capabilities
they use most intensively). Four organizations used a dialogue–corporate silence
response pattern (Unilever, Product Board for Grains, Seeds, and Legumes,
Product Board for Animal Feed, and the Standardization Institute). We could call
this the uncertainty avoider approach to reputation management, because these 
organizations prefer to secure matters pro-actively through dialogue and eagerly
avoid ownership of reputational threats. Three organizations opted for an 
advocacy–corporate silence response pattern (Numico, Ahold, and Gist-Brocades).
This could be called the opportunistic approach to reputation management, because
these organizations tend to engage in highly vocal corporate propaganda when
the public opinion is temperate, but prefer to take a backbencher’s approach when
the public debate heats up. Finally, one organization chose to go with a dia-
logue–crisis communication response pattern (Product Board for Margarine, Fats,
and Oils). This could be called the maverick approach to reputation management,
because it combines a commitment to pro-active problem-solving through dia-
logue with a certain disregard for ownership of reputational threats in times of
heated public debate.
DISCUSSION
We have previously discussed a number of rules and the capabilities they consti-
tute as we identified them in the course of our empirical work. But this descrip-
tive–analytical exercise has left three questions unanswered. First, pertaining to the
rules, where exactly do they come from? Second, with respect to the capabilities,
why do we see differences across organizations in terms of their dominant response
patterns? Third, related to both rules and capabilities, what are the limitations of
the chosen approach?
Origin of Decision Rules
The organizational literature provides two complementary views on the origin of
decision rules: either rule production is seen as an organization-level phenomenon
rooted in learning or as a population-level process grounded in evolution. Accord-
ing to the first perspective, organizational rules are repositories of organizational
experiences. Organizations create rules when they encounter new problems that
do not seem to be covered by their current repertoire of rules. Rule making
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appears to be a particularly fruitful strategy when such new problems are likely to
be fairly recurrent, consequential, or salient (Schulz, 1998). Of course, not all rule
creation involves organizational learning (Mills and Murgatroyd, 1991) and not all
organizational learning crystallizes in the form of decision rules (March and Olsen,
1988), but a fair amount of all organizational learning consists of encoding infer-
ences from history into decision rules that guide future organizational behaviour
(Levitt and March, 1988). The implication of this first view for the present study
is that reputation management capabilities can be seen in part as the codified sedi-
ment of prior organizational experiences with the management of reputational
threats.
Alternatively, the second perspective suggests that rule formation is largely a
consequence of population-level ecological or evolutionary processes. Nelson and
Winter (1982) have proposed an ecological approach in which organizational rou-
tines are analogously seen as genes – path-dependent and relatively inert triggers
of action in organizations. The gene metaphor suggests that rule change within
organizations tends to be slow relative to the rate of change of the organizational
environment. The diffusion of any set of rules across a population of firms can
therefore not strictly be perceived as a deliberately adaptive process. Instead, this
view suggests that variations in the population-level mix of organizational rules
are the outcome of an ecological selection process of differential organizational
growth and survival (March, 1996). The implication of this second view is that the
reputation management capabilities we identified can in part be seen as the prop-
erties of organizations surviving a shakeout process in which firms equipped with
inferior capabilities were weeded out.
Differences in Organizational Response Patterns
Two independent views may explain why we encountered different organizational
response patterns: we can either perceive of responses as deliberate and voluntary
acts, or as steps that are primarily dictated by the organizational environment 
(Hrebiniak and Joyce, 1985). The first perspective suggests that organizations ex-
perience significant strategic choice (Child, 1972), even when they are faced with
reputational threats. This may be the case, for example, when an organization’s
resource dependencies are not very problematic or when it enjoys an influence
over the other organizations in its environment (Emerson, 1962). The strategic
choice perspective predicts that the larger, more powerful players in the modern
biotechnology issue enjoy considerable slack in terms of choosing their desired
response pattern, which implies that they can decide for themselves whether they
want to be ‘mavericks’, ‘opportunists’, or ‘uncertainty avoiders’ (see the cross-
sectional analysis above).
Alternatively, smaller or more dependent organizations are more often forced
to comply with the social norms in the industry and adopt only the response
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pattern deemed most appropriate for them by influential observers (Oliver, 1991).
Adaptation under these circumstances is mostly determined from without, as the
environment weeds out maladapted organizational responses and allows only firms
with desired characteristics to remain in business (Aldrich, 1979). The environ-
mental determinism perspective predicts that organizations lacking power or the
leverage of critical resources must very carefully match reputation management
capabilities with reputational threats. Advocacy and dialogue capabilities can be
used for issues, when response time and stakeholder receptivity are in relatively
generous supply. When crises break, corporate silence and crisis communication
capabilities should be used to minimize the risks of wasting time and galvanizing
stakeholders.
Limitations of the Chosen Approach
The findings and implications of this study must be considered in light of its lim-
itations. One limitation of this study is that it is distinctly organizational – as
opposed to strategic – in scope. The study was purposively designed to identify the
types of systematic internal responses organizations develop to protect themselves
against the impact of reputational threats. No effort was made to link these
responses to organizational outcome variables such as financial performance, per-
ceived legitimacy, or corporate reputation. This clearly limits the practical and 
theoretical implications of this study, as it does not allow us to comment on the
relative effectiveness of the individual responses and response patterns we identi-
fied. An important avenue for future research could therefore consist of an empiri-
cal test of the performance implications for firms confronted with reputational
threats of adopting the reputation management capabilities we uncovered.
A second limitation of this study is that it is exclusively based on a grounded
theory methodology (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). The main attraction of this
approach is that it allowed us to devise ‘thick descriptions’ of the responses orga-
nizations use to withstand organizational threats, which adds to the novelty and
insightfulness of our findings by unearthing many contextualized, socially em-
bedded facts. The downside of our choice for grounded theory is that this
approach cannot be used to establish the generalizability of our theory of repu-
tation management capabilities as decision rules. An important opportunity for
future research could therefore be to develop a large-scale cross-sectional study
spanning multiple industries and covering several different reputational threats to
assess directly whether our approach is robust enough to explain reputation man-
agement in different settings.
CONCLUSION
A first contribution of this research is that it shows that organizations can develop
up to four qualitatively distinct reputation management capabilities in order to
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protect themselves against the impact of reputational threats. Dialogue capabili-
ties allow managers to build cooperative and trust-based relationships with a broad
range of external constituencies. Advocacy capabilities enable managers to per-
suade external audiences that the organizational position with respect to a con-
troversial reputational threat is both appropriate and right. Corporate silence
capabilities are aimed at avoiding organizational ‘ownership’ of critical reputa-
tional threats. Finally, crisis communication capabilities allow managers to inter-
act meaningfully with affected parties, even under conditions of high adversity and
time pressure.
A second contribution of this paper is that it also shows how the outcomes by
which these capabilities are denoted (dialogue, advocacy, etc) are obtained within
organizations. We propose that capabilities are composed of decision rules, which
fulfil three crucial functions for linking the actions of individual members to orga-
nizational outcomes. Rules circumvent the problem of bounded rationality by
allowing individuals to make decisions according to the logic of appropriateness
rather than the logic of consequentialism. They also solve the problem of coor-
dination by supplying collaborating specialists with a ‘grammar’ for sequencing
and synchronizing their behaviours. Finally, rules offer a remedy for the problem
of delegation by aligning the interests of delegator and delegatee before the latter
is asked to make any decisions. It is important to note that our grounded theory
study of organizational responses to reputational threats has demonstrated the
applicability of this behavioural approach to organizational capability, but it has
certainly not exhausted future research possibilities in this area. We therefore plea
for subsequent studies offering further conceptual refinement and empirical testing
of the decision-rule approach to organizational capability.
NOTES
*We thank Oana Branzei, Hans van Oosterhout, Karen Legge, and two anonymous JMS reviewers
for helping us to improve this paper. Naturally, we assume full responsibility for any remaining errors.
[1] Fombrun and van Riel (1997, p. 10) define corporate reputation as ‘a collective representation
of a firm’s past actions and results that describes the firm’s ability to deliver valued outcomes
to multiple stakeholders. It gauges a firm’s relative standing both internally with employees and
externally with its stakeholders, in both its competitive and institutional environments.’ The
definition we use here is completely in tune with the one proposed by Fombrun and van Riel,
but shorter and more focused on the ‘relative standing’ aspect of corporate reputations.
[2] Consider the following anthology of recent reputational threats: AOL Time Warner’s inflation
of sales by booking barter deals; Arthur Andersen’s shredding of documents after the SEC
launched an inquiry into Enron; revenue inflation through ‘channel stuffing’ at Bristol-Myers
Squibb; Coca Cola’s bungling with a contamination incident in Belgium; Dow Corning and
the issue of leaking breast implants; Enron’s use of off-the-book partnerships to hide debts; the
insider trading scandal at Martha Stewart Omnimedia; Merck’s recording of uncollected con-
sumer-to-pharmacy co-payments; Phillip Morris and the issue of second-hand tobacco smoke;
Qwest Communication’s inflation of revenue through the use of network capacity ‘swaps’; and
WorldCom’s overstating of its cash flow by booking operating expenses as capital expenses.
[3] We thank an anonymous referee for bringing this point to our attention.
[4] Since an explicit aim of this paper is to inductively develop a specific theory of reputation man-
agement capabilities, we need a more generic ‘baseline’ or ‘searchlight’ theory of organiza-
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tional capability to guide our observations and interpretations of empirical facts (Popper,
1934/1959). Without some kind of theoretical frame of reference, it would simply be impos-
sible to separate salient from irrelevant observations.
[5] This definition is partially based on Philip Pettit’s (1996) definition of rules: ‘normative con-
straints that determine that one member – or perhaps one subset – of a set of options is more
appropriate in some way than alternatives’ (p. 65). Also see the discussion on the ‘logic of appro-
priateness’ (Cyert and March, 1963) in the present paper’s section entitled: ‘Decision rules and
the problem of bounded rationality’.
[6] Examples offered by Grant (1996a) include the routinized behaviour of surgical operating
teams and auto racing pit crews. Berman et al. (2002) add the example of teams operating in
the National Basketball Association.
[7] Note, however, that unwritten rules are not necessarily tacit in a Polanyian sense (Polanyi, 1962):
they are uncodified but not necessarily uncodifiable. This is significant because researchers can
then study such rules and put them in print, even if an organization abstains from doing so
itself (for examples, see Tables II–V of the present paper).
[8] There is an immanent tension between the depth (contextuality) and breadth (generalizability)
of any theory. The grounded theory methodology tends to generate theories that are highly
contextual, but potentially less generalizable than theories generated by other means. We thank
an anonymous referee for reminding us of this trade-off.
[9] This mode of inquiry, which consists of double-checking findings by using multiple sources and
modes of evidence, has become known as triangulation (Huberman and Miles, 1998). The
origin of the term can be traced back to Campbell and Fiske’s (1959) ‘multiple operational-
ism’ – using multiple measures to ensure that the variance reflected in the dependent variable
derives from the influence of the independent variables and not from the measures in use.
[10] See the discussion section of the present paper for a view on where these rules came from.
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